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AN  EXAMPLE  OF  CONVERGENCE TO  RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS 
WITH  HETEROGENEOUS  BELIEFS* 
By  MARK  FELDMAN' 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the stability of rational expectations 
equilibria (REE) in a model with Bayesian agents who initially possess a correct 
specification of the underlying structure of the economy but are uncertain of the 
values of some parameters.  This can be an extraordinarily  complicated problem 
because of an infinite regress in expectations.  In making their optimizing deci- 
sions, agents must consider not only their own beliefs regarding parameter values, 
but also the beliefs of  other agents, the beliefs of  other agents regarding other 
agents' beliefs, etc.  The contribution of this paper is to demonstrate that in a 
specific  partial  equilibrium  setting  adapted  from  Townsend  [1978]  there  is 
convergence to the rational expectations equilibrium in spite of the initial hetero- 
geneity of beliefs. 
The topic of convergence to rational expectations has recently been the focus 
of considerable attention (for a survey of the literature  see Blume, Bray, and Easley 
[1982]).  The papers in the literature can be characterized according to whether 
the  learning mechanism of  agents  is  Bayesian or  "boundedly rational' .2  In 
a  Bayesian model, agents are Bayesian decision makers whose prior beliefs are 
consistent with the underlying structure of the world they inhabit.  The Bayesian 
paradigm implicitly assumes that agents are able to discern the (possibly stochastic) 
functional  relationship  between  parameter values  and  equilibrium outcomes. 
If in the original model agents don't "know" the rational expectations equilibrium 
it is because they are uncertain of the prameter values.  Inevitably, the Bayesian 
"solution"  entails augmenting the probability space by embedding within it all 
conceivable parameter values, so a state of the world includes a specification of 
the realization of  all parameter values, and imposing the rational expectations 
equilibrium concept for the augmented model. 
In the boundedly rational-models of learning, agents are typically portrayed as 
* Manuscript  received  July, 1985; revised  January,  1987. 
1 I am indebted  to Christian  Gilles,  Jack  Marshall,  Jon Sonstelie  and  especially  two anonymous 
referees for their helpful suggestions.  I  also wish to  acknowledge beneficial conversations 
David Easley, James  Jordan, and  Chris  Sims.  It  should not  be  inferred that  the  above 
individuals  share the opinions expressed  in this paper and of course only I am responsible  for 
any errors. 
2  Recent  papers  that adopt a Bayesian  approach  are Blume-Easley  [1984]  and Feldman  [1986], 
while Jordan [1985, 1986], Marcet-Sargent  [1986]  and Woodford [1986]  are boundedly  rational 
models of learning. 
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classical or Bayesian statisticians who erroneously perceive themselves as being in 
a  stationary  environment.  But  because  of  the  feedback  effects  induced  by 
changing beliefs, the sequence of  equilibrium outcomes in learning models is a 
non-stationary stochastic process.  Possible interpretations of boundedly rational 
behavior are: (1) each agent naively assumes that no other agents are engaged in 
learning estimation, or (2) agents do not recognize (or consider to be negligible) 
the dynamic impact of aggregate learning. 
The  equivalence  of  the  modern  neoclassical  theory  of  von  Neumann- 
Morgenstern expected utility maximization with the  Bayesian paradigm (for  a 
discussion, see Arrow [1970])  provides strong justification for  analyzing inter- 
temporal learning in an explicitly Bayesian framework.  The alternative approach 
of assuming bounded rationality has been justified on grounds of the plausibility 
or  reasonableness of  the  specific forecasting scheme.  (For  instance, see  Bray 
[1982],  Blume-Easley  [1982],  DeCanio  [1979],  and  Marcet-Sargent [1986].) 
It  has been emphasized (especially by Bray-Kreps [1981])  that in contrast the 
sophistication and computational skill required of  agents in correctly specified 
Bayesian models is beyond human capability. 
While this argument is not without merit, many of the boundedly rational models 
provide an incomplete framework to address the asymptotic issue of whether or 
not there is convergence to a stationary rational expectations equilibrium.  Typi- 
cally these models yield convergence to a rational expectations equilibrium for a 
set of parameter values, the "stable set", but there is also a non-negligible comple- 
ment in the parameter space for which with positive probability there is either no 
limit stochastic process or else the limit is not a rational expectations equilibrium. 
When convergence to  a  rational expectations equilibrium does  not  occur,  the 
limiting  behavior of  agents  is  implausible.  They  continue  to  abide  by  their 
forecasting scheme despite overwhelming statistical evidence of model misspeci- 
fication.  The  robustness  of  rational  expectations  as  a  long-run  equilibrium 
concept  cannot  be  challenged by  such a  scenario.  In  practice, agents  would 
ultimately revise their model rather than persisting with an estimation procedure 
evidently flawed. 
Jordan [1985]  has  a  general equilibrium model  with non-Bayesian learning 
which is exempt from the above criticism, in that there is a.s. convergence to a 
REE for all parameter values.  But to  guarantee the existence of  a temporary 
equilibrium, Jordan assumes that within each period there is learning in "virtual" 
time.  Agents acquire information despite the absence of any genuine economic 
activity.  The  within  period  learning can  be  interpreted as  an  informational 
tatonnemont  process.  Since  individuals may  acquire more  information  from 
this  process than could  be  inferred from  the  equilibrium price, this  modeling 
strategy may exaggerate the information transmitted via the market mechanism. 
In much recent work, especially in macroeconomics, the economy is modeled 
as  a  stationary REE.  A  distinct issue  from  how  best  to  model  how  agents 
"actually learn" is whether the stationary REE can be embedded in an internally 
consistent theory of  decision making when we allow  individuals to  be initially CONVERGENCE  TO  RATIONAL  EXPECTATIONS  637 
uninformed regarding parameter values that they know in the REE.  A frequent 
defense of the REE concept is the assertion that rational agents will make optimal 
use of  all available information, i.e.,  they will act as Bayesian decision makers. 
Often, there is an auxiliary, albeit tacit, assumption that a consequence of such 
behavior is  convergence to  a  stationary REE.  But what if  this conjecture of 
convergence is false?  This would place those who advocate the stationary REE 
as the appropriate long-run equilibrium concept in the peculiar position of having 
to reject Bayesian theories of learning while simultaneously endorsing models in 
which agents rigorously adhere to  the tenets of  Bayesian decision theory.  The 
usual normative arguments advanced to support the stationary REE as an equi- 
libium  hypothesis  are  not  compelling  without  demonstration  that  such  an 
equilibrium will be attained as the limit of a Bayesian learning scheme. 
An important but unresolved issue in analyzing learning is whether the esti- 
mation scheme in Jordan [1985],  or in other models with bounded rationality, 
has a superior claim to plausibility or reasonableness than the Bayesian method- 
ology.  Until now, all of the positive results in the boundedly rational learning 
literature rely upon an extreme degree of coordination in agents' forecasting stra- 
tegies.  Jordan [1985],  recognizing this remarked, "One especially troublesome 
feature of the scheme we have constructed is that the convergence of a trader's 
estimated expectations depends on the use of the same estimation procedure by 
the other traders.  This raises the possibility that convergence could be impaired 
if traders seek to somehow tailor their estimation procedures more closely to their 
own  characteristics."  Radner,  also  an  advocate  of  the  boundedly  rational 
approach,  made  a  similar  comment  (Radner  [1982,  p. 992])  regarding  the 
Bray  [1982] model. 
This implicit (or  chance) coordination  of  estimation schemes is  akin to  the 
common knowledge assumption made in this paper.  And, while the degree of 
sophistication of Bayesian agents with a correct specification of the structure of 
the economy  may seem beyond human capability, the a  priori  likelihood that 
agents will adopt any particular ad hoc rule is surely nil.  So even if the family 
of boundedly rational rules collectively offer a plausible description of learning, 
this is insufficient to conclude that any single boundedly rational scheme is plau- 
sible.  Hence,  without  demonstration  that  the  qualitative  results  are  robust 
under mild behavioral deviations, neither the Bayesian or any boundedly rational 
learning rule can provide a fully satisfactory positive theory of learning.  Unfor- 
tunately,  this  research program of  verification of  robustness appears difficult. 
To start with, it is not obvious what is an appropriate topology to place on the 
space  of  sequential decision  rules.  (Kadane-Chuang [1978]  have  investigated 
this  issue  in  a  non-sequential setting and  have  some  mildly  positive  results.) 
But the conclusions in Diaconis-Freedman [1986] on the sensitivity of consistency 
of Bayes procedures with respect to the prior probability, starkly limit the scope 
of theorems one could hope to obtain regarding Bayesian robustness. 
The model used in this paper is essentially that in Townsend [1978].  Townsend 
[1978]  is a model with a continuum of producers with quadratic cost functions 638  MARK  FELDMAN 
facing a linear stochastic demand function with a parameter 0 which is not only 
unknown, but also the beliefs of others firms regarding  0 are unknown.  Townsend 
(section V) succeeds in deriving closed form solutions for the infinite order beliefs 
of agents for each time period.  He conjectures, but is unable to prove, that beliefs 
of all orders converge to  some limit that induces convergence to  a REE.  The 
principal result of this paper is that Townsend's conjecture is correct; beliefs of 
all orders do converge and in the limit rational expectations prevails. 
The uncertainty agents have regarding 0 is treated in this paper in accordance 
with the approach to  games of  incomplete information advocated by Harsanyi 
[1967, 1968].  Bray and Kreps [1981] and Blume and Easley [1984] have previ- 
ously adopted this framework for modeling the behavior of  agents with heter- 
ogeneous  information.  Similarly, the  asymptotic convergence results in  these 
two papers and my paper are in large measure consequences of the Martingale 
Convergence Theorem.  In  contrast  to  the  model  in  this  paper,  the  Blume- 
Easley model has the merit of being embedded in a general equilibrium  framework. 
But to achieve this generality they are forced to assume: (1) that the parameter 
space 0  of possible probability laws governing the economy is finite, and (2) the 
period t behavior of an initially uninformed trader depends solely upon current 
characteristics (endowment  and  preferences) and  their  beginning-of-period  t 
probability measure on  o.3  No  such assumptions are needed in this paper. 
The remainder of  the paper is oiganized  as follows.  Section 2 consists of  a 
formal description of the model.  Existence of an equilibrium and convergence 
in L1 to the REE are proven in Section 3.  A sufficient condition to  prove a.s. 
convergence and characterize the equilibrium as a function of beliefs regarding 0 
is provided in  Section 4.  Section 5 contains conclusions and remarks regarding 
possible generalizations. 
2.  DESCRIPTION  OF THE  MODEL 
There is a measure space of firms  (I, R, A)  where I = (O, 1], R is the Borel a-field 
and A is Lebesgue measure.  To avoid extraneous measure-theoretic  technicalities 
the assumption is made that there are a finite number of types of firms.  Firms 
of  the same type are identical in all respects.  The set of  types is denoted by 
L={1,  2,...,  1}.  Firms  of  type  s  consist  of  the  set  Ase  6  with  A(As)=As, 
A, oa A,=q5,  and  U  As  =I.  The  type function  T :I-+L  is  defined by  z(i)=s 
s+v  s=1 
for i E AS. 
The probability space on which all random variables are defined is (Q, Y,  P). 
The prior probability P is shared by all firms.  As in the seminal paper of Harsanyi 
3 In choosing their consumption,  the traders  in Blume-Easley  [1984]  maximize with respect 
to their  beginning-of-period  marginal  probabilty  distribution  of the state of the world  s,  ignoring 
any information in  the current  price realization.  But, in updating their beliefs they use a 
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[1967,  1968], the viewpoint here is that any divergence in beliefs among firms 
arises from them receiving different information.  The information available to a 
type s firm prior to period t is represented  by the sub-a-field 3S,t-  where t E T= 




The firms produce a  homogeneous  product for  which the period  t per firm 
demand function is Dt(pt)  =  -  bpt+ 0+t.  The price coefficient b is a parameter, 
in the sense that its value does not depend upon the realization of co  E Q.  0 is 
the exogenous random variable in the model for which firms may have asymmetric 
initial  information.  It is  the  possiblity  that  P(0e  AllFs,O)  # P(0 eAll;v,O)  for 
an  arbitrary Borel  set  A,  that  induces  the  intricacy of  the  learning process. 
Initially the only assumption made with regard to  0 is that 0 is strictly positive 
and integrable.  This is sufficient to prove that outputs of firms converge in L1 
to the REE outputs.  Further restrictions made in Section 4 yield a proof of a.s. 
convergence and allow a simple characterization  of output as a function of beliefs. 
The sequence of random variables {;t}jtr  is i.i.d. with mean zero.  Also, the 
the sequence {fe} is independent of 0 and the sub-a-field F&L. 
The output of firm i in period t is qit which is a random variable since it is 
chosen in accordance with firm i's expectation at time t-1  of Pt, the period t 
price which is also a random variable.  The realization of  qit  is denoted by qi, 
which is produced at cost 2j q?t where a > 0  and  qit 2 0.4  Firms are  assumed 
to be risk-neutral so  in an  equilibrium qit  = Max{O, aE[PtjjIY(i),t_  J}.  The per 
capita output is Ot defined by Ot(o))  = qf  (w)i(di)  for w e(  Q. 
To  guarantee the  existence of  an  equilibrium, restrictions must  be  imposed 
upon a  and  b.  Define  cs  by  cs=  Z  u  and  CMax  by  cMax=Max  cs.  We 
y+s au  +b  seL 
shall assume that CMax  < 1.  Either a <  b or 1  < 2 are sufficient  to imply that CMax  <  1. 
Initially all firms of type s form conditional expectations of all relevant random 
variables by conditioning with respect to the sub-a-field Fs,O  (and all type s firms 
use the same version of conditional expectation).  In a manner which is explicitly 
described in  Section 3, this determines q4i for  i E  '-1(s).  The equilibrium price 
function P1(  ) is the solution to  the equation  (wo)  = qiJ1  (o)A(di) =-bP1(w)  + 
0(w)  +  ?1(w). 
Upon  observing the price Pl,  the realization of  Pl,  firms revise their beliefs. 
That  is,  firms  of  type  s condition  with respect to Es,i  = Es,O v  (Pj).  This  enables 
them to choose period 2 output, etc. 
It is easy to calculate that if 0 has a degenerate distribution that the rational 
_ _  _  a 0 
_  expectations  equilibrium is  Pt=-  0  +  Eq  with  qit=  for  all  i e L.  The  maa+b  q  a  r  b 
main result of the paper is that even when-  0 is a non-degen  erate random variable, 
4  In this context there is no sensible  interpretation  of negative  outputs.  But the equilibrium 
price  can be negative  if et  is sufficiently  negative. 640  MARK  FELDMAN 
asymptotically all firms can infer the realization of  0 and that this inference is 
common  knowledge.  This implies that  i  aO  and  that  Pj-  5  +  common  ~~~~~~~~~~a  +b  L  a +b? 
Bt 2  0.  In other words, the sequence of  temporary equilibria converges to 
the rational expectations equilibrium. 
3.  FORMATION  oF  PRICE EXPECTATIONS 
The first task in determining the evolution of prices and outputs over time is to 
define a  temporary rational  expectations equilibrium  (TREE), the equilibrium 
concept that is assumed to describe the behavior of firms at a given point in time. 
3.1.  Definition.  A period t TREE is a family of  output functions (qit)ic  eI, 
a price function Pt, and a vector of sub-o--fields  St1  =(Yl,t--  1'  1..  . ,  i't-  1) 
such that: 
i)  qit( *  ) is jointly measurable as a function of i and c(), 
ii)  Pt: Q-R  satisfies f4it(w))A(di)  =  -  bPt(w)  + 0(w) +  t(ow), 
iii)  qit(a)= Max{O, aE[P?  IY(i),t_  1] (c)}  for all i E I for almost all w). 
The assumption of a continuum of firms implies that the output choice of any 
single firm does not affect the equilibrium price.  Hence, in this context competi- 
tive behavior is equivalent to Nash behavior. 
3.2.  Definition.  A period t Bayesian-Nash  equilibrium is a family of  output 
functions (qit)i  e t, and a vector of  sub-cr-fields  St-  1 =(F,t-  2  1'  i'.,  ,  i  ) 
such that 
i)  4it( *  ) is jointly  measurable  as a function  of  i and  (), 
ii)  qit(o) =  Max {O, a-[E(0 1  -  SF(i),t  1)(o)) -E(Qt  II.F,(i),t  - 1) (c))]}  for  all  i e I  for 
almost all  (), where Ot(o))  =  4jo))A(dj). 
3.3.  PROPOSITION.  For  a given  vector  Ft of sub-cr-fields, (4it) are  equilibrium 
outputfunctions  in a TREE iff  (it)  are a period t Bayesian Nash equilibrium. 
PROOF.  Trivial. 
Because of the structure of the model certain useful refinements can without 
loss  of  generality be imposed upon the definition of  an equilibrium.  Since all 
firms are risk-neutral  and the cost function is strictly convex, in an equilibrium all 
firms of the same type must have identical output functions.  Let  ts  denote the 
period t equilibrium output for type s firms.  To  characterize qs  suppose that 
(t  'n 
2 q...  q, 
s1  sl 
q.  1,  4)  is  the  vector  of  equilibrium  output  functions 
for  the  types  other  than  s.  If  [E(0Y11,s,t-  1) ((D)-E  AuE(4uJJFs,t-  1) (()]  <0  then 
u#s 
4s(o_))=0  since  E[PtJs,t_1]  (c())  <0.  If  [E(011Fss u) (s)  -  ZXE(t  s  1)(()] 
UbaS 
>  ,then  for  qit  =  qts  to  constitute  a Nash  equilibrium  in the  sub-game  among  the CONVERGENCE  TO  RATIONAL  EXPECTATIONS  641 
set of  firms A  it is necessary  that  qs(w)=  [E(E(O  Y831s',)(w))-  Y(qtlYut-)(w) 
-Auqst())].  Upon  rearranging  we  have  qs(w)  =  aj?  [E(0  .s,t  -1) (  ))- 
Ei A E[qt'll s1t-)].  This motivates the following  definition of  an equilibrium 
u#s 
that will apply for the remainder of the paper. 
3.4.  Definition.  A  Bayesian-Nash  equilibrium  is  a  sequence  of  output 
functions {t}tl  1 where  t = n(,1,  42'.-  n  qt),  a sequence of price functions {A}0= 
and a sequence of sub-o--fields  {9s,tj}=1 ??1  such that: 
i)  4s:  Q-*R is  Fst-1  measurable, 
ii)  Pt: Q-R  is defined by Y As{b=P-bt+0?+et, 
iii)  FS,  t = -Ss,  t- 1  v a(-Pt)  I 
iv)  for all u E L, for almost all  (), 
t(o)) = Max {O, aE[Pftjj  94,t- 1] (c))} 
= Max {O, 
a  [E(O  11  97,t-  1)  (c))-E(Z  Y As4 11  X  9,Wt- 1 (c)) 
Firms observe the realization of  Pt but no  other aggregate market data. 
In particular, Qt(w-))  is not  revealed to  the firms.  The formal statement of  the 
revision of beliefs that occurs upon observing Pt()) = Pt is that  7s,t  = 9s,t  1voa(Pt) 
for all s E L.5  Upon  determining the posterior beliefs, firms can choose period 
t  1 outputs, etc. 
Before plunging into the technical details of proving existence of an equilibrium 
and limit theorems, as an aid to  the reader the basic conceptual ideas will first 
be  sketched.  The  first step  to  define a  space Y*  of  information structures 
exploiting  mathematical  results  introduced  into  the  economics  literature by 
Allen [1983]  and subsequently Cotter [1986].  A space Y  of output functions is 
defined along  with a function F:  Y  x Sf'-* Y  that is continuous.  For  Y  c'*, 
F(Y',  ) is a contraction mapping with the fixed point being the equilibrium output 
function  for  information  structure Y.  Since  the modulus  of  the contraction 
mapping is uniform over YF, the fixed point mapping E:  F*-*Y  is continuous 
and so convergence of a sequence of information structures implies convergence 
of the corresponding sequence of equilibrium output strategies. 
For  s E L,  define 9s  **  to  be the family of  all sub-o-fields of  S.  Define an 
equivalence relation  on  s,  **  by Y'  9"  if for every G e 9,  there exists G'e9' 
such  that  P(GzG')=O  (and  vice  versa).  Define  Ys' *  to  be  the family  of 
equivalence classes of  .s,**.  Before endowing  .s,*  with a topology  we need 
5 All the results  of this paper  extend to the case where  firms receive  information  in addition 
to that generated  by prices.  As long as  (  1Va(P))css,  for all s and t, none of the 
proofs require  modification. 642  MARK FELDMAN 
two technical results.  The first  result proved by Boylan [1971] is that the random 
variable generated by conditioning with respect to a sub-cr-field  Y  depnds upon Y 
only through its equivalence class. 
The other result is that if a sub-c-field 5? is generated by the union of two other 
sub-cr-fields  (this is the technical representation of updating of beliefs), then the 
equivalence class that Y  is a member of depends only upon the equivalence classes 
of the other two sub-cr-fields. 
3.5.  LEMMA. Let 92*  cE  s,*  and let  92k,  Y2  E9*  then E[XjYj1]=E[XII92] 
a.s. for  every X eL(Q,  .F,  P). 
PROOF.  (Boylan [1971, Theorem 2]). 
3.6.  LEMMA.  If 92*, yf *eys,*,  92l,  Y2  Y*  and X1,  Y2ce*,  then Y,  v 
-  t-  Y2  V -2  . 
PROOF.  See Appendix. 
Collectively, the two  above results allow  us to  dispense with the formalism of 
distinguishing between a  sub-a-field and the equivalence class of  which it is a 
member. 
If  Y and Z are two arbitrary Banach spaces let BL(Y, Z) denote the space of 
bounded linear operators from Y to Z.  Y's,  * can be identified with a subset of 
BL(L1, L1),  *where  L1 =L1(?Q,  Y,  P),  by  associating  with Y* e  5s,  * the  map 
X -E[X  jj  ]  for X E L1 and 92e92*.  Because of  Lemma 3.5 this map is  inde- 
pendent of the choice of  Y  E Y?*. 
Adopting a suggestion of  Coffer (1986), we endow  Fs, *  with the topology  T 
of  pointwise  convergence.  Since  for  X eL1  and  GeFs,**,  IIE(XIIG)II<j?Xl, 
ES * is an equicontinuous family. 
3.7.  LEMMA.  The function  J:  .s,*  x L1 -L1  defined by  J(92, X) =E(X1192) 
is continuous. 
PROOF.  (Kelley [1955,  Theorem 7.15]). 
For  se  L,  let  L- = L1  and  define the  Banach space  92=  X Ls  with  1  q 11= 
Is=l 
As  ,5jqsJj  for q = (q',  q2  ..q)  E)  .  Define  F*  =  X  s,*  and  endow y*  with 
s  s=l 
theproduct topology.  For Y =(Y',  5029...2lY')e.*  define tu:  F*  x Y-4Lu  by 
Qfru(l9.  2Y', ql,...,  ql)=  aa  [E(Oi9Y2u)  -  Y  AE(qs  19Yu)].  Ignoring nonnega- 
tivity constraints,  /u  is  the response function of  type  u  firms based  on  their 
6 I am grateful to a referee for suggesting  that a contraction mapping argument could be 
invoked to prove uniqueness  and generalize  the existence  theorem in a previous version of this 
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information of  the output strategies of the other types.  Define  /:  J*  x Y-*>Y 
by  /(Y,  q) =(1(  q),  2(,  q),...,  i'(Y,  q)),  where  Y7* is  defined  as  in  the 
proof  of Lemma 3.7. 
We  now  proceed to  prove that  /  is continuous for all 9  e  F*, and V(Y,.): 
f/-*f  is a contraction mapping with a uniform (in 9)  modulus.6 
3.8.  LEMMA. Let X  be a Banach space with u e X  and f  a  linear operator 
from  X  into X  such  that  11f  1  <1.  Then 0:  X-X  defined by  k(x)=u+f(x) 
is a contraction mapping. 
PROOF.  |(x)  -  b(y) II =  || u + f(x)  -  u -f(y)  || 
=  Ilf(x)  -f(Y)II  <  lif 11  * lx  -  Y11 <  llx -  Y11. 
3.9.  PROPOSITION. /  is continuous and for  all  9  e*  the function  /(Y',*): 
Y-*YS  is  a  contraction with modulus  less  than or equal  to cMax(recall  cMax= 
Max{  - aX  b } is by assumption less than one). 
ueL  s+u  aAs + 
PROOF.  Continuity  is  a  direct  consequence  of  Lemma 3.7.  For  Y 
\  aX+  I,-,  Y1) e >  *, definef  52  S  by f,(q  I,  q 1) =  Y 
AsF(sq  ) 
-  +  s2iE(qs 
I 
),E  ,-  a+b  E(qsj) 
Since  ~/i(S",  q)  L  a?b  E(011Y9),  ai<?b  E(O1  ,y2), a..  ?  E(0  )j  + 
f,*(q),  it  suffices  to  demonstrate  that  f  ? cCMax.  Because the  conditional 
expectation  operator  is  a  linear map  with  norm  equal  to  one (Neveu  [1965, 
p. 123]),  11  Z  aA,  E(qujjYs)Ij  <  E  aX  s  -  IIqul  So  IIf (q)  II  < E Fu  E 
s7lu aA +  s+u a  ?+  bu  su 
a  IIj<cMll Z 
YAuIqujj=CMax  iail  III  anhneIYICa<1.  aXA  + b  CMax  and hence  cMax 
We can now define the best response function for type u, Fu:  *  X  -+L1  by 
Fu(Y,  q)(w-))=Max  {0,  ,u(Y,  q)(w-)}.  The  collective  best  response  function 
is  F:  YF*  x f/-*f/'  defined by  r(y,  q)=(r'(y,  q),  r2(y,  q),...,  rl'(Y,  q)). 
3.10.  PROPOSITION.  F  is  continuous and for  all  9  ceY*,  F(Y,  Y-*Y 
is a  contraction with modulus less than or equal to CMax. 
PROOF.  To  prove continuity it  is  sufficient to  prove that  FU  is  continuous. 
But Fu(Y,  q)=M(  u(Ys,  q))  where M:  L1-+L1  is defined by  M(X)(w)) =Max  {O, 
X(w-)}, and since M is continuous, Fu is continuous. 
From  Proposition  3.9  Z AXIIs(  )-Is(4)II<  cMax  II-l  for  4, qeL.  So 
the  conclusion  is  implied  by  proving  that  E  As  1 Fs(4)  -  Fs(q)  <  E  As  s(4)  - 
/s(4)  l.  But  rsJ-Fs(4)  ?  =?  IMax  tO,  is(q4)(w)}  -  Max  tO,  ,s(4)(cw)}IP(dwj) 
<  fQ  I  ,Is(4)  (o,)  - 
I/s(4  (o  ,.)  I  P(d.w  1,Is 
)  IstA1 644  MARK  FELDMAN 
Define  the  one-period  equilibrium  output  function  E:  Y  +*  S  by  E($f)  = 
F(S,  E(5?)).  Because of Proposition 3.10 and the Banach Fixed Point Theorem 
this definition is without ambiguity.  The vector of period one equilibrium output 
functions is 4, =E(,o),  Y1 is defined by  .  =(s0,  ,  VP1, Y0,  2VPI,.,  YOIVPl), 
42=E(F1),  etc. 
The above results are summarized with the following theorem. 
3.11.  THEOREM.  There is an (essentially) unique Bayesian-Nash  equibrium. 
The equilibrium satisfies the recursive equations: 
i)  q-t  + 1 =  E(97t) 
ii)  St  =  V',t - I v o(Pt), F2,t - I v  (Pt),  *,t  - 1  V  o(P)). 
00 
Defining F,,0,,  =  v  F,,  and .FO  = (l,  Y,0,..*,  a7,(c)  a consequence of a cor- 
t=O 
ollary to the Martingale Convergence  Theorem is that  t,  and'so  t 
So proving that E is continuous implies that 4,-+  4,  where 4,, is defined by 40 = 
E(F,J3). Note that this is convergence in S  but not a.s. convergence of {q4t  to 4,,. 
3.12.  LEMMA.  -S,,?O  and  3-t+$O 
PROOF.  (Billingsley [1979, Theorem 35.5]) implies 3ts  -+Y7,,.  Since F*  has 
the  product  topology,  -tt 
3.13.  PROPOSITION.  E is continuous and q  IqO.. 
PROOF.  To prove continuity let (J;,)  be a net (Kelley [1955, Chapter 2]  is a 
standard reference on nets) converging to Y,,  and define q, = E(SF,).  Let Oe  be 
an open sphere centered at q,0 with radius E.  It suffices to prove that (E(g,))  is 
eventually in OE. Let V be an open sphere centered at q,0 with radius less than 
(1-  cMax).  F is continuous so F(Y,,  q,0)--q,0 and is eventually in V.  Applying 
a  standard  successive  approximation  result  (see  e.g.,  Smart  [1974,  Remark 
1.2.3  (iii)])  F(F,,  q,0)  e V implies  E(q,) E Q,  so  E(qa) is  eventually in  0,  E 
continuous and  t  0  imply  that  Lt L 
The final step is to demonstrate that 4o =( aob)  for all s E  L.  Define Zt by 
Zt=b  '[O-Zs4s  ],  so  Zt=P?-  Et  Define Z  by Z  =b-I[O-  -Z2,4'0]  and 
observe that Zt  Li 
,Z00. 
3.14.  LEMMA.  For  all  scEL,  E[ZtjIEs,t_  l1] Li >  E[Z.  0,IIsY,,] and E[Z,, 1,Y,s,o] 
a.s.z_ 
PROOF. Since Zt  Li  Zo,,  by direct application of an extension of the Martingale 
Convergence Theorem  (Blackwell-Dubins,  [1962,  Theorem 2]),  E(ZtjIs,,_D-* 
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We  now  demonstrate  that  E[Zo,3 j,7,  j=Zoo  a.s..  Choose  a  subsequence 
{Z}  such  that 
Ztk-!-*Z, 
.  Define  Z'o  by  Z=  lrn  Z  ktk  nm-  IZ 
k=1  k=1 
(Ztk+  ;k).  Z'  is  Fo  measurable and by the strong law of large numbers Z'  = 
Z4O.  So  ZOO =ZOO  aS.E[ZIy'  J  >s,00]=E[ZoojIFs8j.0]D 
3.15.  LEMMA.  Zcj>OPa.s.. 
PROOF.  Let  A={cowZ0(co()<0}  and  since  qso=Max  {O,  aE[ZojllSs,00]}= 
Max {0, aZ},  qs (co)= 0  for  almost  all  c  e A.  Define  the  exceptional subset 
Ec  A  by  E = {co  E A  lls E L s.t.  q4s(co)  # 0},  P(E) =0.  For  o)  E A-E,  00(w) =0 
so Z4,(ow)  = b-'((cO()-Qoo(c))  = b-0(c)>0,  contradicting c  E A.  Hence,  A -  E 
=0  and P(A) = 0. 
3.16.  THEOREM. Z?O=  +b  and qs  aO  P a.s.  for  all seL 
PROOF.  Observe  that  Cqsja  s Max {0, aE[ZY01,js  = Max {0, aZ.,}  =aZ4. 
The first equality is by definition, the second by Lemma 3.14, and the third by 
Lemma 3.15.  =:aZoo  for  all  seL  implies  Qc=aZc,  and  so  Qt  Li>aZ 
But  Ot=  0-bZt  and  since  Zt  Li  >Z.,  Qt  Li  >O  bZ0  So aZ00=O-bZ  or Z0 = 
0  a  aO 
a+b  and qS  =  a+b. 
Since Zt  Li  Zoo  - Li ,  s,  and Pt  = Zt +  'et  Theorem 3.16 implies convergence 
(in L1) to the rational expectations equilibrium. 
4.  EQUILIBRIUM  AND BELIEFS  REGARDING 0 
In this section, we impose a strong restriction on the support of 0.  This restri- 
ction yields a uniform (in s and t) bound on  qs  that enables us to represent qs 
as a function of type s expectation of 0, type s expectations of average expectations 
of 0, type  s expectations of  average expectations of  average expectations, etc. 
Applying an extension of  the Martingale Convergence Theorem we prove that 
there is a.s.  convergence of  expectations of  all orders and this in turn implies 
that  qs  a.s.>  aO 
The restriction on a, b, and the support of 0 that is assumed throughout this 
section is: 
ASSUMPTION 4.1.  The  support  of  0  is  contained  in  an  interval  supp  0c 
[OMin,  OMax] with 1>  Min >  a 
0Max  bI 
4.2.  PROPOSITION.  P  a.s. for  all  seL  and for  all  t,  t=1,  2,...,  (omin 
b OMax) <  bt  <boMax. 646  MARK FELDMAN 
PROOF.  For all ucL  and all t, q?O0 so E[4uIIFs,-,]>0  Pa.s.  and similarly 
E[01u,tl1]<OMax  P  a.s..  So  qs=Max  0,  ,  +a  [E(O1!s,t-  1)-  Z.AE( 
FS,t-  1)]  <  Max {,  a,K+?b OMax} <  OMax. 
To roe  ha  4  >at  a  N  a  To  prove that  q>  -KOb  Min - 
bOMax)  we  observe  that  since  4t <7TOMaxv 
[E(0IJFs,t-1)-  E  AuE(quII9s,t-j)]20  and  so  qt=  a  b [E(O II st-1)- 
E  AuE(quIFs,t-j)]  The  last  equality  and  ju <  a  imply that  Mit 
a 
[E(0 jjF(i),  t-1)  -E(Q0tj  jt(i),  t-1)]  >  LOMin  -  aOMax]. 
With slight modification, Proposition 2 of Townsend [1978] provides an explicit 
characterization of the equilibrium as a function of beliefs, beliefs about beliefs, 
etc.  To facilitate comparison with the work of Townsend [1978] his notational 
conventions are adopted. 
The expection of 0 for firm i prior to time t+  1 when co occurs is denoted by 
mo,t(i,  c)  where by definition mot(i,  o)=E[0JlY(i),t](Co).  The average expectation 
of  0  across firms is  denoted  by  the random variable O0,t defined by  Ol,t(())= 
SI  mo(i,  o)L(di).  The  expectation  of  0O,t for  firm  i  is  the  random  variable 
mi,(i,.)  defined  by  m'1(i, w))=E[0j,tljI(i),t]  (co).  Continuing  in  a  recursive 
manner,  0kt( *) =I  1nk-  l,t0,  *))(di)  and  mk,t(i,  . )=E[Ok,till  >(i),t]  (*).  Sometimes 
I will write mk,j(i)  as a shorthand for the random variable mk,(i,t*  ) 
Idefineoanfor  n=O, 1, 2,...  byo  n=Q=  )  (- 1)n. 
4.3.  PROPOSITION.  (qit)  is  a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium in output strategies 
00 
iff  it=  E  ccnmn  ,t_(i)  for  all  i eI. 
n1=0 
PROOF.  In Appendix. 
Define  mo,o(i)  by m0,o(i)  =  E[011KF(i),o0] 
4.4.  PROPOSITION.  moj(i)-mo  ,0(i)  for  all  i E I  P  a.s.  . 
PROOF. This follows from the assumption that all agents of the same type use 
the  same  version  of  conditional  expectation  and  that  for  arbitrary  i E I, 
mo,j(i) a. s >  mo,,(i)  (Billingsley, [1979, Theorem 35.5]). 
4.5.  COROLLARY.  With  01  00  defined by  01j,(co)=f  mo,y3(i, o)>(di), P  a.s. 
0l,t  +01 ,oo0 
PROOF. This is a direct consequence of  Proposition 4.4,  the boundedness of 
0, and the Dominated Convergence Theorem (Billingsley [1979, Theorem 16.4]). 
I define  mk1j,3(i)  by  mkl,O(i)=E[Okl  l(i),C]  and  define  Ok,cx,  by  Ok,ci= 
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above,  mk,  oo(i) and  0k,  0  are well-defined for all  k.  An induction argument is 
now invoked to  prove that for all  k, Okt  t  Ok,oc  and  mkt(i)  a>mk  o(i)  for all 
i and k. 
4.6.  PROPOSITION.  Let k=1,  2, 3,....  Suppose  mk-  1,(i)mk-1  oo(i)  for  all 
ieI  P  a.s.  and  Ok,tas>Ok,oo.  Then  mk,(i)-mk,oo(i)  for  all  ieI  P  a.s.  and 
Ok  ,t  sk  + 1,oo 
PROOF.  By a generalization of the Martingale Convergence Theorem (Chung 
[1974,  Theorem  9.4.8]),  0k,t-a-s  0k,oo  implies  E[0k,tIIS  ,t]  n-s-->  E[0k,o  I  YsoJ-  So 
mk,t(i)-+mk,oo(i)  for all  i E As, P  a.s. .  Since there are a finite number of  types, 
mk,  (i)  -  Mk,  oc(i) for  all  i E I, P a.s.  . 
Since  0  is  bounded,  by  the  Dominated  Convergence  Theorem  mnk'(i)-mk,(i) 
for  all  i E I  P  a.s.  implies  f mkj(i)X(di) a. s- >X  mk,,(i)X(di)  or  equivalently 
k+l  ,t  > 
' 
+  k  1,co' 
4.7.  COROLLARY. For  all  k=O,  1, 2,...,  mkt(i)0m+k,oAi) for  all  ieI  P  a.s. 
and Ok+1  t a, s>0k+1  ,x 
PROOF. Follows  from  Propositions  4.4  and  4.6,  the  Corollary  4.5  and  a 
standard induction argument. 
4.8.  PROPOSITION.  4i,oo  =  Z ;tnmn,  o(i),  q4i,t-  >i,oo  and Q  >  O.. 
PROOF.  Because  0  is  bounded,  a < b,  and  m,nt(i)-im,  ,(i),  the  Weierstrass 
00 
M-test  for  series  (Billingsley  [1979,  p.  180])  implies  that  4i,t-  Z  0nMn,t(0) 
iL 
n  ,M  i)-  Since ji,,  is uniformly bounded,  ,  Lt>  t  ;m,  ,(i).  So 
n=O  n1=O 
oo 
by Proposition  3.13,  ji,c) =  Z all1  tn,,x(i).  Since  qi,ti  j,00  for all  i, P a.s., 
n=O 
f 4(wo)M(di)  -  f  4>J i,j(w))A(di)  or  t a-.Q 
Summarizing  the above results, we have almost sure convergence to the rational 
expectations equilibrium. 
4.9.  PROPOSITION.  q-it  aO  and  Ot  + O  P  a.s. . 
PROOF.  By  Theorem  3.16  qi=  aO  and  QD= aO  P  a.s.  The  conclu- 
sion follows from Proposition 4.8. 
5.  SCOPE  FOR GENERALIZATION  AND CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
The results of  this paper validate the logical possibility of  convergence to  a 
rational expectations equilibrium in  a  world inhabited by  Bayesian agents for 648  MARK  FELDMAN 
whom  there is  not  only  parameter uncertainty, but  also  uncertainty regarding 
the beliefs of  other agents.7  The assumptions in the body of the paper are so 
stringent, though, that no general conclusions can be inferred.  So we are com- 
pelled to  ask the extent to  which the convergence result is roubust to  a more 
general specification. 
Within a partial equilibrium setting with risk neutral  firms, generalization  is not 
difficult.  For  example one  could model  b as well as  0 as a random variable, 
making sufficient  restrictions  on the joint support to insure existence of a temporary 
REE.  While this can result in an identification problem for b and 0 individually, 
_  b  will  remain identifiable.  The  assumptions  of  linearity of  the  demand 
function and quadratic cost functions can also relaxed. 
A different sort of generalization would be to allow multiple shocks each period 
or to  allow  the shocks to  be governed by a  more complex stochastic process. 
For instance if the demand function was Dt(pt)  = -  bpt  + 0Xt + et where the distri- 
bution of  Xt is common knowledge, independent of 0, and {Xt} is i.i.d. then the 
techniques used in this paper to prove convergence to the REE are still valid.8 
But if {Xt} or {et} is a Markov process then the analytical issues are much more 
difficult.  It is relatively easy to  bound the asymptotic deviation from the REE, 
but it is not apparent how to prove convergence to the REE when the shocks are 
Markov. 
It would also be of interest to further investigate the implications of Bayesian 
learning in general equilibrium models.  To pursue this topic one has to construct 
a model with an associated notion of equilibrium such that the temporary REE 
are non-revealing.9  Suppose now  that  the  parameter space is  09, a separable 
metric space, and  that the  existence problem is  resolved.  Then as  in  Blume- 
Easley  [1984]  and  Bray-Kreps [1981]  the  Martingale Convergence Theorem 
guarantees that  beliefs regarding & converge to  some  (possibly random) limit 
beliefs.  The technique used in Section 4 can be extended to assure that beliefs 
of  all  orders converge.  But as  stressed by Bray-Kreps [1981] convergence  of 
beliefs will not in general imply convergence of the sequence of  temporary REE. 
The smoothness (and other) assumptions needed so that the temporary equilibria 
are continuous function of beliefs may be quite severe. 
So whether the static REE studied in microeconomic theory can be viewed as 
the limit of a Bayesian learning process remains an open question. 
7 It is asserted  by Frydman  [1982]  in a similar  framework  that asymmetric  initial information 
precludes  firms from learning  over time the knowledge that is necessary  to sustain a rational 
expectations  equilibrium. The techniques  of this paper can be adapted to demonstrate  that 
Frydman's  claims are incorrect  if the firms in his model act as Bayesians  with a common prior 
along the lines of Harsanyi  [1967, 1968]. 
8  A referee  encouraged  me to consider  this case. 
I It is not yet resolved  how best to model  the economy  to assure  the existence  of a non-revealing 
REE.  Allen ([1985a]  (circulated  as Allen [1982a])),  Allen ([1985b]  (circulated  as Allen [1982b])), 
and Anderson-Sonnenschein  [1982]  have made some progress  in this direction. CONVERGENCE  TO  RATIONAL  EXPECTATIONS  649 
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APPENDIX 
PROOF OF LEMMA 3.6.  Let  9  = {D1 E Y,  v  1:  ]D2  E  Y2  v X2  s.t. D1  ,D2}  It 
suffices to  prove  that  9  =  Y  v  -.  D has the following properties: (1)? e -9, 
(2) Ae?9, Be?9, and A cB  imply B-Ae?i9,  and (3) Ane?9, An  T A, imply  A  e-9. 
So  by definition  9  is a A-system [Billingsley (p. 33)].  Define the family -'  of 
subsets ofY  byS={Fe  IF=G,  n  H1 s.t. -  eY1  and X1  elX1  }.  is closed 
under intersection and hence is a 7r-system.  f  c  9  and so by the 7i -  . Theorem 
(Billingsley [1979, Theorem 3.2])  a(f9 )c  9.  But a(A9)=J'1  v  1  so  Y  v 
PROOF  OF ROPOSITION  4.3.  This requires only  minor modifications of  Propo- 
sition 2 in Townsend [1978].  Suppose that jjt=  Z  cnmn1,t 1(j).  By Assumption 
4.1  jmn,t(j)jj  is uniformly bounded in n, t, and j.  By the series version of the 
Dominated Convergence Theorem (Billingsley [1979, Theorem 16.7]), f1  q-Ijt(dj) 
00  00  00 
=  f  .nMn,t -1(j)2(d1j)=  Z  ?n0n+1,t-11  So  Pt-=b  1[Z  o, 0,+1  ,t1  -0-ej 
and Et[PAIjF,,t_  1]  V-bI[  E  onM,n+  1,t- 1(i)-mo,t -l(i)]  for i E As.  Therefore, the 
11=0 
output that  maximizes  conditional  expected  profit  is  I  b[  ocnm,n+  1t_-i)- 
100 
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